What would a ground invasion mean for Lebanon and Israel? | Israel-Lebanon attacks news

The conflict between the Lebanese Hezbollah group and Israel, which has been simmering for months, if not years, has been exacerbated by Israel’s ongoing attack on Gaza.

What was once speculation – and is now fact – is no less shocking: a full-scale war between Hezbollah and Israel is underway.

The last 13 days have seen a dramatic increase in violence between Hezbollah and the Israeli military. Against a backdrop of airstrikes and rocket attacks, Mossad’s campaign of mass murder, using pagers and walkie-talkies against Hezbollah members, left dozens of people dead and thousands injured. A wave of airstrikes and retaliatory missile attacks followed.

On September 23, Israel launched its largest airstrike in years after threatening the people of southern Lebanon to leave immediately or face destruction. With the bulk of the Israeli Air Force, more than 1,300 targets were hit throughout Lebanon, but especially in the south. They were the most intense air strikes in years.

Four days later, Hezbollah’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, was killed along with the group of senior commanders he was meeting with when 85 “bunker buster” bombs fell on one in a brutal decapitation strike that leveled several buildings southern suburbs of Beirut were dropped in built-up areas.

Nevertheless, Hezbollah continues to fire rockets and missiles at Israeli targets. An airstrike will not be the solution to Israel’s problems. Hezbollah has been preparing for exactly this scenario for years, spreading its rocket forces across the country. So what’s the plan?

Four scenarios

By sending reinforcements to the north, the 98th Division of combat-hardened airborne troops and the activation of reservists in units of the Northern Command, Israel is sending a signal: it is serious about its intentions in dealing with Hezbollah.

But what does that mean in practical terms? What would victory look like for Israel?

Eradicate Hezbollah? This is highly unlikely. The group is anchored in Lebanese society, particularly among the Shiite population in the south of the country.

Fighting Hezbollah will only strengthen it, since it is impossible to eradicate Hezbollah as an idea.

When Israel announced it would destroy the group in 2006, it made Israel look weak since at the time Hezbollah only needed to survive the conflict to claim victory – a low bar.

A quick violent raid? This is also risky. Attacks on local Hezbollah missile sites and command centers play a role in Hezbollah’s strength. The group has been training for this case for years. Its fighters have received extensive training and may have combat experience from the war in Syria.

Are you stoking dissent and possible civil war in Lebanon? This would be an unlikely scenario in which the simmering dissent of some parts of Lebanese society towards Hezbollah would be exploited and somehow encouraged, especially after the group helped put down demonstrations in 2019 against the escalating economic crisis. The idea would be to keep Hezbollah occupied and focused on the interior rather than Israel.

This would be a longer-term strategy with no guarantee of success and the all-too-real likelihood that any civil conflict would change in scope and direction and metastasize into something no one could control, least of all Israel.

Create a buffer zone and drive Hezbollah forces away from the border? Possibly, but ultimately a potential disaster.

A buffer zone

It may sound good on paper or in a meeting, but any attempt by Israel to create a buffer zone around the border would most likely end badly for Israel.

To create the buffer, Israel would have to deploy ground forces to hold the ground. The mountains and rocky terrain make movement difficult and restrict tanks and other vehicles to roads, making Hezbollah ambushes much easier.

In 2006, Hezbollah surprised Israeli forces by effectively ambushing their tank columns and shelling Israeli patrols. Israeli army units struggled to defend themselves, and their inexperience often led to catastrophic mistakes. At least 20 tanks were destroyed or damaged beyond repair during the war as commanders with no combat experience led column after column of tanks into carefully prepared ambushes.

That won’t happen this time. Israel has learned from its mistakes; Its combat units are battle-hardened, if exhausted, after a year-long battle with Hamas militants in the city. Internally, the Israeli army is open and relatively quick to voice and correct errors in doctrine. Your army won’t make the same mistake twice.

But Hezbollah has also learned and significantly strengthened its power. In 2006 there were about 5,000 fighters in the south. This number has now grown to around 20,000 to 30,000, with thousands more in reserve. Its special unit, the Radwan Force, has 3,000 soldiers who are specially trained for operations in the south and know it like the back of their hand.

Both sides are using technology, namely surveillance drones, to track the opposition. Hezbollah has a large arsenal of sophisticated anti-tank weapons such as the Kornet missile, which has proven effective against Israel’s Merkava tanks.

Any buffer zone means Israel must maintain troops in the buffer zone in fortified positions, along with aggressive patrols, surveillance and air power. All ground forces would be constant targets for roadside bombs, snipers, ambushes and rocket attacks. As long as Israeli forces remained there, a stream of body bags would return to Israel.

Even if this scenario were to occur, it would not prevent Hezbollah from launching rockets, missiles and drones into Israel. Israeli military planners could increase the depth of the buffer zone. However, Hezbollah has an arsenal large enough to fire rockets from anywhere in Lebanon and could still hit targets deep inside Israel.

The larger the territory captured, the more Lebanese would fall under Israeli occupation.

As rocket attacks would continue from parts of Lebanon not yet controlled by Israel, an ever-expanding buffer zone would eventually reach practical limits or be forced into the unlikely position of taking over the entire country or withdrawing.

There is a real danger of “mission creep,” where a simple goal—in this case, creating a buffer zone—sounds easy to achieve but is impossible to achieve. This would, in the long run, plunge the Israeli military into a quagmire that its finances can ill afford, a disaster waiting to happen.

At what point does Israel realize that there may be no military solution to this impasse and that negotiations over Gaza are the answer?